Abstract: The sections of the online appendix discuss: related product design exercises; the details of the example reported in Section 4 of the main text; proofs omitted from the main text; and proofs of results included in the appendix. Results on product design establish why horizontal product di¤erentiation is pro…t-maximizing for the monopolist, and why niche products can be optimal when multiple varieties are for sale.
Product Design Results
This section considers the product design problem faced by a durable goods monopolist. The monopolist assembles products from a basket of characteristics. For instance, a smartphone producer may decide which features to include in a new line of devices (such as screen resolution, battery size, memory, and camera), or an automobile manufacturer may choose how to blend performance, practicality, size, and fuel e¢ ciency. The way these characteristics are assembled might generate dependence and dispersion in consumers' valuations for the varieties. Therefore, we ask how di¤erent product designs a¤ect the pro…t of the monopolist. For instance, would the monopolist prefer vertically di¤erentiated products or horizontally di¤erentiated ones? Should the monopolist produce mass products with low volatility in valuations, or niche products with high dispersion in valuations? To tackle these questions, we study how optimal market-clearing pro…ts are a¤ected by the distribution of buyers' valuations. This approach relies implicitly on Proposition 3 and is legitimate for markets in which the monopolist can frequently revise prices. We refrain from presenting an explicit model in which products are constructed by bundling characteristics, for the sake of brevity.
The …rst result …xes the marginal distribution of buyers'valuations for each variety and asks what correlation structure between varieties maximizes the pro…t of the monopolist. This approach is valid whenever production costs depend only on the marginal distribution of valuations and not on their correlation structure. Results exploit classical contributions on copulas (Sklar 1959) to establish that the pro…t-maximizing design requires full horizontal product di¤erentiation. Horizontal di¤erentiation increases pro…ts, as a strong preference for one variety tends to be associated with a low desire for the other. This favors market segmentation and increases pro…ts by minimizing the value of units that are never purchased. One may conjecture that vertical product di¤erentiation may then be the pro…t-minimizing design. However, we establish that this is not the case in general, as independent products occasionally generate smaller pro…ts than vertically di¤erentiated ones. The other substantive contribution analyzes how volatility in valuations a¤ects the seller's pro…ts. In particular, it asks whether the monopolist prefers a distribution of values or its mean. In a single-variety setting, the answer is trivial, as the monopolist always dislikes variance (in one case the product is sold at the minimum value, while in the other at the average value). However in multi-variety settings, two opposing forces are at play. Variance increases both the information rents of buyers, thereby hurting the monopolist, and the value of the durable good (that is, the value of the preferred variety), thereby bene…tting the monopolist. The analysis establishes that either of the two forces can dominate, and it provides su¢ cient conditions for both scenarios. This shows why low-volatility mass products need not be an optimal design when multiple varieties can be sold.
Classical Results on Copulas:
Recall that F i denotes the marginal cumulative distribution of the consumers'valuations for variety i. For the rest of the analysis, let F i be continuous, and let its support be the compact set V i = [0; v i ] [0; 1].
1 Before proceeding to the design problem, we brie ‡y review the notion of copula and some of its properties. For a more detailed discussion of these topics, we refer to Nelsen 2006.
A function C : [0; 1] 2 ! [0; 1] is said to be a copula if
Let C denote the set of all copulas. Sklar's Theorem implies that for any joint distribution function F with continuous marginal distributions F i for i 2 fa; bg, there exists a unique copula C such that
A copula C can therefore be thought of as a su¢ cient statistic of the dependence structure between the two random variables. A commonly used copula exhibits no dependence between the random variables and is associated with the joint distribution
. Two other noteworthy copulas are known as the Frechét-Hoe¤ding (FH) bounds and are associated with the two joint distributions
Figure 8 depicts the support of these three copulas when marginals are uniform on [0; 1]. In a classical contribution, Frechét and Hoe¤ding establish that the two FH copulas bound any other feasible copula C.
Proposition 3 Any joint distribution F consistent with the two marginals, F a and F b , satis…es
Random variables v a and v b are said to be concordant if The FH bounds L and K characterize instances of extreme concordance and discordance, respectively, and they are thus associated with a Kendall's Tau of 1 and 1, respectively. 
The next result highlights a few well-known properties of the FH bounds that play an important role in our product design analysis. A subset V of R 2 is non-decreasing if for any
Proposition 4 The joint distribution F is equal to its: (1) FH upper bound K if and only if its support V is a non-decreasing subset of V a V b ; (2) FH lower bound L if and only if its support V is a non-increasing subset of V a V b . Moreover, random variable v a is almost surely a strictly monotonic function of v b if and only if the copula coincides with one of the FH bounds.
The result implies that it is possible to construct monotone correspondences v a = k(v b ) and v a = l(v b ) that completely pin down the support of the FH bounds. The additional assumptions imposed on the marginal distributions further imply that these correspondences are functions such that k 0 (x) 2 (0; 1) and l 0 (x) 2 ( 1; 0) almost surely.
2 For any two pro…les v and v 0 in the support of the joint distribution, Kendall's Tau amounts to
Product Design Results: Our product design exercises begin by analyzing how dependence (or association) between the random variables v a and v b a¤ects the optimal market-clearing pro…ts. By the analysis carried out in Section 4, our conclusions also identify how dependence a¤ects the limiting stationary equilibrium pro…ts of the dynamic pricing game. The …rst result …xes the marginal distributions F i (postulating that any costs incurred in generating value depends only such marginals) and asks which joint distribution compatible with such marginals maximizes optimal market-clearing pro…ts. Formally, let V F denote the support of a joint distribution F , and let F denote the optimal market-clearing pro…ts associated with the joint distribution F . Speci…cally, we solve the following problem:
The next result establishes that optimal market-clearing pro…ts are maximized at the FH lower bound. Thus, the seller always bene…ts from selling varieties that are most discordant. Intuitively, selling discordant varieties maximizes pro…ts as segmenting the market guarantees that no value is wasted on varieties that are never purchased.
Proposition 5 For any joint distribution F consistent with the two marginals,
The result implies that independent varieties are suboptimal since horizontal product di¤er-entiation allows for more e¤ective market segmentation. As the monopolist loses its ability to intertemporally discriminate buyers (when the time between o¤ers vanishes), statically screening consumers by selling di¤erent varieties is the only option available to extract any surplus. But such a task is most pro…table when the market is segmented and values are discordant.
The other product design contribution looks at how variance in valuations a¤ects the pro…tability of the monopolist. When a single product is for sale, the monopolist always prefers to minimize variance, as the durable good necessarily trades at the lowest valuation in the support. However, when multiple varieties can be sold, a trade-o¤ emerges, since variance increases both buyers' information rents (which hurts pro…ts) and total surplus (which bene…ts pro…ts) as the maximal value grows. Thus, we ask whether the monopolist prefers a distribution F to the distributionF in which all buyers value products at the mean of F (that is,F is a degenerate distribution with unit measure at E F (v)). The result establishes that the answer to this question depends on the details of the measure F when multiple varieties are for sale.
Remark 8 Minimizing variance does not necessarily increase pro…ts.
The next examples prove this observation and show why variance is most bene…cial when values are discordant and the support of the distribution is a concave map.
Product Di¤erentiation Examples: Given that discordance increases pro…ts by Proposition 5, one may conjecture that a lower bound on optimal market-clearing pro…ts may then be pinned down by the other FH bound. This would be the case if separating high value consumers for the two varieties were most di¢ cult with concordance. But, such a conclusion does not hold in general, as we show with the next example.
Consider two products with uniform marginal distributions on V a = [0; 1] and V b = [0; x], respectively, for some x 2 (0; 1]. Three compatible designs are: (1) perfect concordance, when the joint distribution of consumers'preferences is K and the support is
(2) independence, when the joint distribution of consumers'preferences is I and the support is
when the joint distribution of consumers'preferences is L and the support is
The …rst scenario corresponds to classical models of vertical price di¤erentiation. The set of market-clearing prices, M K , coincides with the set of price pro…les in which at least one of the two prices is non-positive. When varieties are independent, the set of market-clearing prices does not change (that is, M I = M K ). In both these scenarios, the optimal market-clearing pro…ts are found by setting the price of the worse variety to zero (that is, p b = 0), while choosing the other price so as to maximize pro…ts. When varieties are discordant, any price in the support of the distribution V L clears the market, and optimal market-clearing prices belong to the support. The solutions for the three cases respectively satisfy:
where d a denotes the demand for variety a at the optimal market-clearing prices for the proposed design. As argued in Proposition 5, the monopolist always prefers to choose a design that induces perfect discordance, as
Moreover, optimal market-clearing pro…ts increase in x when varieties are discordant, but they decrease in x otherwise (see Figure 9 ). With vertically di¤erentiated products, optimal market-clearing pro…ts decrease to 0 when products become less di¤erentiated (that is, when x ! 1), as expected from Proposition 1. Surprisingly however, perfectly concordant varieties raise more revenue than independently distributed ones when x is small. This follows because when x is small, the monopolist sells the expensive product to a larger measure of buyers with concordance than with independence at any market-clearing price. The second example illustrates why reducing variance in valuations can have ambiguous e¤ects on optimal market-clearing pro…ts. The insight provides a novel rationale for a monopolist to sell products with volatile valuations (thus establishing why low-volatility mass products are not necessarily a pro…t-maximizing design). First, consider the discordant distribution
The support of L is given by the decreasing set
associated with L can be found by solving
The monopolist optimally clears the market by selling all units at a price of 1= p 2. In this scenario, the seller bene…ts from the variance, as
More volatile niche products are optimal. When the measure of high-value buyers is large, the minimal valuation for the preferred variety exceeds the average valuation, and thus niche products are preferred.
Liking Variance Disliking Variance
Figure 10: E¤ects of volatility on optimal market-clearing prices in two markets.
Next, consider the discordant distribution
pro…ts associated with L can be found by solving
The monopolist optimally clears the market by selling all units at a price of 1=4. The monopolist is now hurt by the variance, as
Less volatile mass products are optimal. When the measure of low-value buyers is large, the average valuation exceeds the minimal valuation for the preferred variety, and thus mass products are preferred. Figure 10 depicts the measures considered and optimal marketclearing prices for the last two examples.
One may postulate that the monopolist prefers variance whenever varieties are perfectly discordant and the support is a concave map. However, this is not true in general. For instance, when L(v) = maxfv
Mixing Example
Consider a market in which = 3=4, and in which the support of valuations is
The dark blue region in Figure 11 depicts this support. As regularity is mainly needed for existence, we consider an atomic example failing regularity for the sake of tractability. Of course, similar conclusions would hold for regular markets in which the support is the convex hull of V (the light blue shaded region in Figure 11 ) and in which almost all of the measure is near V . Consider the following joint distribution on support V :
Intuitively, such a distribution puts 1=10 of its measure on the atom at (1; 1), while 9=10 of the measure is uniformly distributed on the rest of V . If so, the marginal distribution for each variety amounts to
For convenience, de…ne the following function which identi…es the larger component of the support V :
Optimal Pricing: First consider the benchmark setting in which the monopolist can commit ex-ante to a constant price pro…le. If so, for any p = 2 M such that p i p j , the seller's pro…ts would simply amount to
and the associated optimal commitment prices and pro…ts would be equal to
Optimal Clearing: Then consider the alternative benchmark in which the monopolist must set a price pro…le that clears the market instantaneously. Clearly, the seller would never set prices in the interior of the market-clearing price set. Thus, if it sold variety i at price p i 1=4, it would sell variety j at price p j = g(p i ), and for any such a price pro…le p, pro…ts would amount to
The associated optimal market-clearing prices and pro…ts would then be equal to
Constructing Mixed Strategy Equilibria: We look for equilibria in which the market clears in two periods, both varieties are sold at a common price in the …rst period, and the seller randomizes with equal probability between two symmetric market-clearing price pro…les in the second period. Throughout the example, we denote by i the variety that is sold at a higher price in the …nal period and by j the other variety.
We begin by constructing the equilibrium path of this symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. To nest all cases, consider subgames in which a fraction 1 of the measure at (1; 1) has already purchased in the …rst period. Consider the equilibrium path active buyer set
for some x 2 [1=4; 1). In subgame A, the payo¤ to the monopolist at any market-clearing price p 0 2 M n M amounts to
The subgame possesses two optimal market-clearing prices, which amount to
We look for …xed points of the game in which: (1) the seller sells both varieties at a common price p in the initial period; (2) the atom at (1; 1) purchases in the initial period; and (3) the boundary of the active player set is determined by buyers who are indi¤erent between buying the same variety today and tomorrow. Fixed point conditions in general require that the boundary of the active player set be pinned down by the incentive constraint
As the boundary of the active player set x is determined by buyers who are indi¤erent between buying a variety today and tomorrow,
From this, the subgame prices can be pinned down as a function of the initial price quoted by the seller:
For the atom to be willing to purchase in the initial period, it must be that 1 p
, which in turn requires that p < 13=32. Finally, to have such a …xed point, the marginal buyer must satisfy
which holds for p 1=4. Therefore, such a …xed point can exist and be consistent with equilibrium behavior provided that p < 13=32.
The previous conjectures on the structure of the equilibrium imply that the objective function of the monopolist at the initial stage when setting the same price p for the two varieties simply amounts to
Maximizing this objective function with respect to the initial price p identi…es the optimal opening as p 1 = 311=864. Since p 1 < 13=32, the monopolist's behavior in the initial stage is consistent with buyers with value (1; 1) purchasing in the …rst period. At such a price, the present value of pro…ts amounts to
This pro…t exceeds the optimal market-clearing pro…t. Thus, the seller does not bene…t from clearing the market in the opening round. In the conjectured equilibrium, the monopolist initially sells both varieties at price p 1 = 311=864, then randomizes with equal probability between two market-clearing pro…les f(5=12; 7=36) ; (7=36; 5=12)g in period 2.
Asymmetric Deviations and Consistent Beliefs: Next we construct strategies and beliefs for asymmetric subgames in which the market is expected to clear in 2 periods. As before, to nest all cases, let denote the fraction of the measure at (1; 1) purchasing in the second period. Consider asymmetric subgames in which the active buyer set satis…es
for some vector x = 2 M . 3 Without loss of generality, further suppose that x i x j . In subgame A, the payo¤ to the monopolist at a market-clearing price p 0 2 M n M amounts to
In such a subgame, the optimal market-clearing prices satisfy 
Moreover, such prices are unique whenever x i > x j .
We look for …xed points of the game in which: (1) in the initial period, the seller posts a price pro…le p such that p i p j ; (2) the seller does not randomize in the …nal stage; (3) the atom at (1; 1) purchases in the initial period; and (4) the boundary of the active player set is determined by buyers who are indi¤erent between buying the same variety today and tomorrow.
Restriction (4) requires that the boundary of the active player set be pinned down by the two incentive constraints
3 If x 2 M , then A must have measure zero. Thus, we neglect this scenario.
and it further requires that
As before, these conditions identify marginal buyers given the current prices, x(p), and therefore they identify subgame prices as a function of current prices:
As restrictions (3) and (1) require that the atom purchase in the …rst period and that p i p j , equilibrium further implies that
Given the conjectures made about the …xed point, we look for equilibria in which p i p i and x i (p) x j (p). The objective function of the monopolist at the initial stage when setting prices for the two varieties amounts to
Solving this problem, we …nd that the opening prices set by the seller satisfy The monopolist's behavior in the initial stage is consistent with buyers with value (1; 1) purchasing in the initial period, as
Moreover, marginal buyers are not tempted by the other variety as
Thus, all …xed point conditions hold at such prices, and pro…ts amounts to 1 = 479=1664 = 0:28786.
Pro…ts exceed the optimal market-clearing pro…ts, but they are smaller than the pro…ts attainable when clearing the market symmetrically by randomizing in the …nal period.
Many Periods: If the seller were allowed a third period to clear the market, the most pro…table strategy consistent with clearing the market in exactly three periods would require: selling both varieties at a common price in the …rst period, p 2 = (0:38033; 0:38033);
randomizing with equal probability between two price pro…les in second period, Mixing would take place in the second period, as the seller always prefers to clear the market asymmetrically once the atom has purchased, 4 and because the atom necessarily purchases in the …rst period in this example. Alternative strategies in which a measure of buyers purchases goods in any one of the three periods are necessarily less pro…table.
When following such a strategy, the present value of pro…ts would amount to 2 = 0:29057 and would be smaller than the pro…ts the seller was making by clearing the market symmetrically in two periods. Intuitively, in this example, discounting losses would dominate price discrimination gains because buyers are su¢ ciently patient. If the seller had more than three periods in which to sell the product, a similar logic would hold, and pro…ts would further decline under any strategy in which a positive measure of buyers purchases products in more than three periods.
MPE Beliefs:
In any stationary equilibrium after any price history, the market clears in at most two periods. In the notation of the proof of Proposition 2, X t = ; for any t > 2.
The seller never bene…ts by clearing the market in more than two periods if buyers'beliefs are consistent and = 3=4. Moreover, given these beliefs, clearing the market in more than two periods would be even less pro…table since buyers would be more inclined to wait for a discount if the market was expected to clear sooner.
In the desired equilibrium, the seller stochastically clears the market in two periods. In such an equilibrium, whenever p a = p b = p and p 2 X 1 , buyers believe that the prices in the following period will coincide with the prices they would expect if the market had to clear symmetrically in exactly two periods. Thus, buyers expect one of the following two pro…les with equal probability:
Whenever p i > p j and p 2 X 1 , buyers believe that the prices in the following period will coincide with the prices they would expect if the market had to clear asymmetrically in exactly two periods:
For brevity's sake, we omit the derivation of beliefs associated with prices in X 2 , while beliefs associated with prices in X 0 are trivial. By construction, these beliefs are consistent with the seller's strategy, and the seller's strategy maximizes pro…ts given these beliefs. 
for any i 2 fa; bg. As products are unranked, F(v i > v j ) > 0. But if so, optimal marketclearing pro…ts must strictly exceed v b since d a (p " ) > 0 for " su¢ ciently small. If varieties are not identical, it must be that F(v i > v j ) > 0 for some i 2 fa; bg. If so, the price pro…le (p i ; p j ) = (v + "; v) 2 M would raise more pro…ts than v g for " su¢ ciently small.
Proof Remark 2. To prove the …rst part note that by the proof of Remark 1 part (5), the optimal market-clearing price must equal (p i ; p j ) = (v + "; v) for some " > 0 and some i 2 fa; bg. Since V is connected, v 2 V , and (v; v) 2 V , for any 2 (0; ") there exists a v 2 V such that
Thus, the price cannot be e¢ cient if " > 0, as any buyer v purchases variety j despite preferring variety i.
To prove the second part, suppose v a v b . When varieties are unranked and V is connected, e¢ ciency of a price (p a ; p b ) 2 M requires p a = p b . Hence, the most pro…table e¢ cient market-clearing price must satisfy p a = p b = v b , because V is a Cartesian product. But, such a price cannot be optimal by the proof of Remark 1 part (2).
Proof Remark 3. Assume v + a c a . Consider setting price p " = (c a ; c b + ") for some " > 0.
Such a price belongs to M , as for all v 2 V + ,
Hence, optimal market-clearing pro…ts are strictly positive for " su¢ ciently small.
Proof Remark 4. The proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 2 in the main text. Let M + denote the "interior" of the market-clearing price set M + . We show that, in any PBE, all consumers accept any price in M + at any information set. Suppose this were not the case. Select any equilibrium, and let P denote the set of prices that are accepted by all buyers in any possible subgame. By contradiction, suppose that M + is not contained in P .
As before, p 2 P whenever min i2fa;bg p i < 1. To show the latter, observe that Lemma 1 is una¤ected by costs, and that its proof, as before, implies that buyers'value functions at any buyer-historyĥ 2Ĥ are non-decreasing in v and have a modulus of continuity of less than
Thus, in any PBE we have that U (ĥ; v) 1 for all v 2 V , and that all buyers strictly prefer to purchase a variety when min i2fa;bg p i < 1, as
If so, for any " > 0 there is a pricep 2 M + nP 6 = ; such that
To …nd such a pricep, letp a = inf q2 M + nP q a , and for some 2 (0; ") let
where min i2fa;bgpi 1 by (1). Then setp to be any price in M + nP such thatp p + ( ; ).
Such a price exists by de…nition ofp for any su¢ ciently small . Moreover, (2) holds because: (a) p 2 P whenever p a p a " <p a by de…nition ofp a ; and (b) p 2 P for any p a p a when
But, when " is su¢ ciently small,
If so, all consumers would acceptp at any buyer-history (p; h) 2Ĥ. If a type was to reject an o¤er, they could agree no sooner than tomorrow, and the most they could expect any one price to drop is " as any further drop would lead to acceptance by all buyers. Thus, for all v 2 V , the continuation value satis…es
But this in turn implies that max i2fa;bg fv i p i g > U ((p; h); v) for any h 2 H. Asp = 2 P , the latter contradicts the de…nition of P and consequently establishes the result. Since every consumer buys when prices belong to M + , the seller can secure a payo¤ arbitrarily close to the optimal market-clearing pro…ts (A) > 0 (where A = A(h) denotes the active player set associated with history h) by choosing a price in M + .
The proof of the second part of the remark essentially coincides with the proof of Proposition 3 and is omitted for sake of brevity.
Proof Remark 5. First, we introduce some notation. In this setting, all buyers are active in every period. However, the measure of values evolves over time. For any pro…le of values v 2 V , denote the residual value of an owner of variety i by
2 ) denote the measure of residual values of consumers purchasing variety i 2 fa; bg at any history h t 2 H. Then, de…ne the measure of values at history h t as
Let V (h t ) be the support of F(h t ). De…ne the set of buyers for whom gains from trade are positive at history h t as
Refer to buyers in A (h t ) as essentially active. The proof then follows along the same steps of Remark 3. We show that in any PBE, at any history h 2 H, the set A (p; h) must be empty if p 2 M , where M denotes the "interior" of the market-clearing price set M . Suppose this were not the case. Select any equilibrium, and let P denote those prices p such that A (p; h) = ; after any history h. By contradiction, suppose that M is not contained in P .
First, we show that p 2 P whenever p 2 M and min i2fa;bg p i < 1. As before, buyers' value functions are non-decreasing in v and have a modulus of continuity of less than 1 at any buyer-history h 2Ĥ, since an argument equivalent to Lemma 1 implies that for all v 0 v,
Thus, in any PBE we have that U (h; v) 1 for all v 2 V . But then, all buyers must purchase a variety when min i2fa;bg p i < 1, as
where U (ĥ; v i ) 0 denotes the continuation value of buyer v once the value transitions to By the previous argument, for any " > 0 there is a pricep 2 M + nP 6 = ; such that
where min i2fa;bgpi 1 by (3). Then setp to be any price in M + nP such thatp p + ( ; ).
Such a price exists by de…nition ofp for any su¢ ciently small . Moreover, (4) holds because: (a)p 2 M + given thatp 2 M + ; (b) p 2 P whenever p a p a " <p a by de…nition ofp a ; and (c) p 2 P for any p a p a when p b p b " by de…nition ofp b .
When " is su¢ ciently small though,
But if " is small, all consumers must purchase a variety at any buyer-history (p; h) =ĥ 2Ĥ. If a type was to reject an o¤er, they could agree no sooner than tomorrow, and the most they could expect any one price to drop is " as any further drop would lead to acceptance by all buyers. But in that scenario, no more trade could be expected asp ("; ") 2 P and therefore no buyer would be essentially active. Thus, for all v 2 V (h) the continuation value must satisfy max i2fa;bg fv i p i + "g U (ĥ; v).
In turn, this implies that for any (p; h) =ĥ 2Ĥ,
But then, all buyers must purchase a variety atp. Asp 2 M , though, the latter implies that A (ĥ) = ;, which contradictsp = 2 P . Thus,p 2 P and M P . As every consumer buys when prices belong to M and no more trades take place after that, the seller can always secure a payo¤ arbitrarily close to the optimal market-clearing pro…ts in M by charging a price in M .
The proof of the second part of the remark again coincides with the proof of Proposition 3 and is again omitted for sake of brevity.
Proof Remark 6. As the market is regular, 
When the market is regular, however, V is convex, and thus there exist buyers Proof Remark 7. All of the operators de…ned in the …rst part of proof of Proposition 1 are independent of s when z is su¢ ciently large. That is: , there exists a stationary equilibrium f n ; n g in each of these games by the …rst part of the proof of Proposition 1.
Since the sequence of functions f n ; A n g 1 n=0 is equicontinuous, it has a uniformly convergent sub-sequence converging to continuous functions f ; Ag. For notational ease, posit that the sequence actually converges to this limit. For any A 2 K(V ), label by J(A; ; A; ) the limit problem of the seller, and by J n (A; n ; A n ; n ) the same problem for the n th element of the sequence of games.
Since J n is Lipschitz continuous in ( n ; A n ; n ) in the uniform topology for all A 2 K(V ), J n converges to J, and the limit points of n must converge to an equilibrium of the limit game at any continuity point of by the theorem of the maximum. Thus, for all p 2 [0; 1] 2 , we have that lim n!1 n (p) = (p) ) (p) 2 B(A(p; (p)jA)).
Consequently, is an equilibrium of the limit game, and thus a WME exists even when v g = 0.
Additional Proofs
Proof Proposition 5. For clarity, let d F i (p) denote the static demand for product i when prices are p and the measure of buyers is F . Recall that for a joint distribution F , the optimal market-clearing pro…ts satisfy 
where the second equality holds since V L is a non-increasing set, and the third holds since l 0 0. As marginal distributions are continuous by regularity, they admit an inverse. Thus, it is possible to …nd a price p a satisfying
To conclude, we establish that p a p F a . By construction, it must be that
However, since p F 2 M F , it is also the case that 
